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As noted in the introduction to this sec-
tion, the BULLETIN from time to time pub-
lishes, in full, staff studies on economic and
financial subjects that are of general interest
in the field of economic research.
The paper below was prepared by Mr.
Gramley, a member of the staff of the Board
Developments in banking over the past
decade have heightened the importance of
time deposits in discussions of central bank
policy. The decade has seen time deposits
at commercial banks grow by more than 170
per cent, 10 times as fast as demand deposits
held by the public. Since 1961, time deposit
growth has averaged $15 billion a year,
compared with an average of less than $3
billion per year for private demand bal-
ances. Late in 1964, private holdings of
time deposits exceeded demand deposits for
the first time in history.
Three recent developments are particu-
larly noteworthy. First, investors seem to
have become increasingly willing to substi-
tute time deposits for other financial assets,
especially for open market securities, in re-
sponse to changes in yields.
Second, competitive pressures in finan-
cial markets have led to departures from
established traditions of commercial bank-
ing. A decade ago, most time deposits at
commercial banks were modest savings ac-
counts held by individuals. Banks adjusted
the rates of interest paid on these accounts
infrequently; competition with other depos-
NOTE.—An earlier draft of this paper was pre-
sented at a meeting of the Federal Reserve System
Committee on Financial Analysis, Atlanta, Georgia, on
Apr. 29, 1965.
of Governors, and Mr. Chase of the Brook-
ings Institution. As in all staff economic
studies, the authors are responsible for the
analyses and conclusions set forth, and the
views expressed are not necessarily those of
their colleagues or of the Board of Gov-
ernors.
itary institutions consisted mainly of adver-
tising appeals. Commercial banks did little
to attract time deposits in large denomina-
tions—in fact, major banks refused to ac-
cept time deposits from nonfinancial corpo-
rations.
Then in February 1961, for the first time
since before World War II, major commer-
cial banks in New York and Chicago an-
nounced that they would issue large-denom-
ination time certificates of deposit (CD's)
that would be negotiable in the open market
and could be held by any investor. Investors
apparently regarded this new instrument as
an alternative to both demand balances and
market securities in their liquid asset port-
folios, and the volume of CD's outstanding
grew rapidly. But the increased willingness
of investors to substitute deposits for mar-
ket instruments and of banks to compete
aggressively for these funds had their origins
at least as early as the mid-1950's.
The third important development relates
to regulation. Banking legislation of the
early 1930's gave the Federal Reserve and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
power to regulate interest payments on time
deposits, which the Federal Reserve exer-
cises under Regulation Q. The use of this
authority over the past decade has permitted
banks to increase the rates paid on time de-
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posits relative to rates on most other financial
assets. Four times—in 1957, 1962, 1963,
and 1964—interest ceilings have been re-
laxed, and rates paid by banks subsequently
have risen. Policy decisions under Regula-
tion Q were one of the necessary conditions
for recent time deposit expansion.
These developments have reaffirmed the
banker's point of view that deposits are
attracted, not created, as textbooks sug-
gest. Attracting time deposits in the negoti-
able certificate market is one of several
forms of open market borrowing. With the
aid of permissive regulatory rulings, other
new methods of borrowing, through unse-
cured notes and debentures, have also been
employed in recent years. In principle, these
latter methods are the same as "borrow-
ing" through issuing deposits—the differ-
ences are government-made in Washington
and the State capitals and relate to reserve
requirements, insurance, interest payment
limitations, and other creations of the State.
In this new environment, growth rates
of deposits have become more suspect than
ever as indicators of the conduct of mone-
tary policy. Thus, each increase in Regula-
tion Q ceilings has been followed by an ac-
celeration in time deposit growth, and some
observers have warned that the increase in
bank credit and deposits has been excessive.
Others have been concerned that the diver-
sion of funds from market securities and
claims against nonbank intermediaries into
time deposits has not been fully compen-
sated by accelerated growth of bank credit.
Systematic consideration of such ques-
tions requires a framework of analysis from
which the significance of time deposits and
of changing time deposit rates can be de-
duced. Traditional methods of monetary
analysis, which postulate that the money
stock is an exogenous variable fixed by
central bank policies through the "money
multiplier," are not well suited to this task.
In such analyses time deposits, if discussed
at all, are typically assigned a subordinate
role among bank liabilities—treated, per-
haps, as a "leakage" in the process of money
creation or destruction.
1 It would be equally
justifiable analytically to regard the money
stock as a leakage in the process of time de-
posit creation or destruction.
The "new view" in monetary economics
provides a more useful analytic framework.
2
In the new view, banks—like other financial
institutions—are considered as suppliers of
financial claims for the public to hold, and
the public is given a significant role in de-
termining both the total amount of bank lia-
bilities and their distribution among classes.
The special characteristics of the various
classes of claims result in behavioral prin-
ciples that can be incorporated explicitly
into monetary analysis.
The next section of this paper presents
a model of financial behavior that facilitates
treatment of policy questions that arise
when the banking system supplies multiple
classes of liabilities for the public to hold.
Subsequent sections deal with policy impli-
cations of recent developments in banking
and include some empirical evidence on the
implications of increased substitutability
XA notable recent exception is found in Milton
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary His-
tory of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press for the National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1964), where total bank de-
posits (demand and time) are viewed as the multipli-
cand. This approach is no more useful than the tra-
ditional one for the questions considered here.
2 See James Tobin, "Commercial Banks as Creators
of 'Money'," Banking and Monetary Studies, edited
by Deane Carson (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, 1963).
An application of the "new view" to central bank
policy is contained in James Tobin and William C.
Brainard, "Financial Intermediaries and the Effec-
tiveness of Monetary Controls," American Economic
Review, May 1963.
The analytic approach used in this paper parallels
that of Tobin and Brainard, although our model is
designed to deal with different policy questions.
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between time deposits and securities, and
of varying time deposit rates.
The model is simple and permits treat-
ment of only a limited number of questions.
It is not a general equilibrium model but a
partial equilibrium model of the financial
markets. It postulates a single class of open
market security and does not consider the
effect of changes in time deposit rates, and
in the distribution of bank liabilities, on the
structure of interest rates. These are severe
limitations, but light can be thrown on
policy questions even within these con-
straints, and such an approach is a necessary
first step in the development of a more com-
plete analytical framework.
A MODEL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
The model assumes there are four financial
assets—claims against a central bank in the
form of currency and bank reserves, demand
deposits, time deposits, and private securi-
ties. The three sectors in the model include
a central bank, commercial banks, and the
nonbank public—or simply the public.
Currency an,d balances at the central
bank are non-interest-bearing claims held
either by the public as currency or by the
banking system as excess or required re-
serves. Demand and time deposits are lia-
bilities of the banking system and are held
only by the public. Private securities are
issued by the public and are held by both
the public and the banks. The central bank
also buys and sells these securities when it
conducts open market operations. Private
securities are assumed to be all alike in
terms of maturity, risk, and other features
and therefore sell at the same price and
yield.
At any point in time, the dollar volume of
private securities held by the commercial
banks and the central bank measures the in-
debtedness of the public to the monetary
system. The model assumes that public hold-
ings of claims against the monetary system
in the form of currency and bank deposits
equal the volume of private securities held
by the monetary system—in effect, that
the public holds zero net financial claims
against the government and commercial
bank sectors.
3
Linkages between financial and nonfinancial
markets. The model deals with the deter-
mination of equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties in financial markets and, in particular,
with immediate financial responses to cen-
tral bank policy actions. To focus attention
sharply on these matters, we define a period
short enough that changes in financial mar-
ket variables do not influence commodity
expenditures during this period. The finan-
cial markets are therefore a closed system,
with nonfinancial variables assumed to be
exogenous.
The links between financial markets and
markets for goods and services are not in-
vestigated here, although these linkages are
the heart of the process of monetary control.
In drawing out the implications of the anal-
ysis for nonfinancial responses to policy ac-
tions, it is assumed that the interest rate on
private securities is the link between finan-
cial and nonfinancial markets. In fact, a
vast array of interest rates and other credit
terms are involved in the linkage.
Financial behavior of the public. Much at-
tention has been devoted elsewhere to finan-
cial asset demand and supply functions of
the public. The controversy that remains
3 Throughout the model, the wealth implications of
fluctuating market prices of securities are ignored for
reasons of simplicity. The assumption that the public
holds no net claims against the government also is
made to simplify the model and would need to be
dropped if the model were to be extended to cover a
broader range of questions.
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pertains chiefly to the role exercised by fac-
tors taken here as exogenous—such as cur-
rent income, wealth, and the yields on real
assets. Since these exogenous factors are
taken as given, the public's desired alloca-
tion of financial asset portfolios among cur-
rency, demand deposits, time deposits, and
securities depends only upon relative yields
of these assets.
Figure 1 shows the influence of the rate
on private securities, rs, on financial assets
demanded and supplied by the public, for
given rates on bank deposits. In the top
panel, /?£ represents public demand for cur-
rency; Rp + D*D represents public demand
for currency and demand deposits; 2?£ +
D
PD -f T
p represents public demand for cur-
rency, demand deposits, and time deposits.
All three are assumed to be substitutes for
securities. Since the public wishes to hold
more of each at lower rates of interest on
securities, the demand functions slope down
to the right.
4
The net supply of securities the public
wishes to sell to the monetary system, S
ps, is
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1. The
lower the rate of interest, rs, the more secu-
rities the public chooses to offer for the
monetary system to hold—including both
securities outstanding at the beginning of
the period that were held by the public and
new securities issued during the period. This
net supply of securities is not independent
of public demands for currency and de-
posits. On the contrary, the net security
supply must, by assumption, equal public
demand for currency and bank deposits. Ac-
cordingly, the slope and position of S
ps in the
4 For simplicity, all demand and supply functions
of the model are assumed to be linear. The slopes
shown in Figure 1 and elsewhere are hypothetical, ex-
cept to the extent that the logic of the model imposes
such requirements as that the demand functions of
Figure 1 slope down to the right.
lower panel of Figure 1 is identical to the




Public demands for bank deposits also
depend on rates paid on bank deposits. The
lower right panel of Figure 3 (page 1386),
for example, shows the demand for time
deposits, T
p , as an increasing function of the
time deposit rate, n9 given the rate on secu-
rities and the rate on demand balances.
Similarly, the lower left panel shows the
demand for demand deposits, D
PD, as an in-
creasing function of the demand deposit
rate, ra, holding n and rs constant.
It may seem peculiar to speak of an in-
terest rate on demand deposits, since banks
are forbidden by law to pay interest on
demand accounts. The legal prohibition,
however, relates to explicit interest pay-
ments. Banks do, in fact, pay implicit in-
terest on checking accounts—by relating
service charges for check handling and
other services to the size of customers' bal-
ances—and that is the interest rate mea-
sured by r*. There is little evidence, however,
that implicit rates on demand deposits vary
appreciably in the short run, and we assume
in the argument to follow that ra is fixed. (It
is also assumed that service charges per
check are invariant.)
Behavior of the banking system. In this
model, the banking system issues only two
classes of liabilities for the public to hold as
assets—demand deposits and time accounts.
With funds raised in supplying deposits,
banks acquire reserves or private securities.
Banks are required to hold reserves equal to
specified percentages of demand and time
deposits. The percentage requirement for
time deposits is lower than that for demand
deposits. In addition to required reserves,
banks may hold excess reserves.
Banks are assumed to set rates on deposits
and to stand ready to supply all the public











wishes to hold at these rates. Supply func-
tions for demand and time deposits are thus
perfectly elastic at quoted deposit rates, r*
on demand balances and r* on time ac-
counts, as shown in Figure 3.
Delving into the forces that determine
deposit rates would take us far afield from
our main line of inquiry. Initially, therefore,
it is supposed that deposit rates quoted by
banks are fixed by forces not explained in
the model. Subsequently, this assumption is
relaxed to explore the implications of varia-
tions in time deposit rates.
The deposit supply functions of Figure 3
are at variance with the traditional view
found in much of the literature on money




and banking. At this point in the argument,
it seems desirable merely to indicate the ap-
proach to be used here, reserving until later
a comparison with accepted traditional
views.
In this model, banks are not constrained
in their ability to supply deposits by the
existence of legal reserve requirements or by
the level of bank reserves. The required re-
serve ratio may influence the rates at which
an individual bank is willing to supply de-
posits, but at the rates quoted, the quantity
of deposits a bank sells depends on the will-
ingness of the public to purchase its deposits.
Since this is true for each and every bank in
the system, the constraint on bank deposits
—and hence on bank asset holdings—is
derived from the public's desire to hold bank
deposits.
This constraint on bank assets is shown
in Figure 2 by D
PD + 7£, the total quantity
of deposits the public is willing to hold at
varying rates on securities, given rates on
demand and time deposits. D
PD + T
p defines
the total quantity of funds available for bank
investment in cash reserves and earning
assets. Bank demand for required reserves,
R
BDR, is derived directly from the public's wil-
lingness to hold deposits, the mix of deposits
it chooses, and the legal reserve requirements
on demand and time deposits. Banks may
wish to hold reserves in addition to legal re-
quirements, however. The demand for ex-
cess reserves, R
BDE, is taken to be a decreas-
ing function of the rate on securities, reflect-
ing substitution between cash and earning
assets in bank portfolios. The sum of R
BDE
and R
BDR measures total bank demand for
reserves, shown in Figure 2 as R
BD.
At the security rate r* in Figure 2, the
public is willing to hold OD in bank de-
posits. Bank demand for required reserves
at this rate is OB, while demand for excess
reserves is OA (-BC). Dollar demand for
securities by banks, at this interest rate, is
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CD, the difference between total demand by
banks for reserves and their total assets.
Equilibrium in the financial markets. These
postulates regarding the financial behavior
of banks and the public make it possible to
solve for the equilibrium rate on securities,
given the rates quoted by banks on deposits
and the quantity of currency and bank re-
FIGURE 3
serves supplied by the central bank. The
solution is shown in the top two panels of
Figure 3.
The upper left panel shows aggregate
demand for currency and bank reserves,
R£
+B, derived by summing its two separate
components, currency demanded by the
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demanded by banks, R
BD (Figure 2). Ro
represents the total quantity of currency and
bank reserves supplied by the central bank
and is taken as exogenously determined.
Given Ro, the market for currency and bank
reserves clears at the rate r«0,.
The upper right panel shows the aggre-
gate excess dollar demand for securities by
the public and the banks, S
px
+B, together
with the dollar quantity of securities held by
the central bank, Fo. This latter quantity is
measured to the left of the origin at 0, and
is equal to the dollar quantity of claims
against the central bank in the form of cur-
rency and bank reserves. The aggregate ex-
cess demand for securities, S
px
+B, is derived
by subtracting the public's net supply of
securities, S£ (shown in Figure 1), from the
banks' demand for securities (represented





It is readily shown that the aggregate
excess dollar demand for securities must, at
each rate of interest rs, be equal in absolute
value to the aggregate demand for currency
and bank reserves, R
P^
B, but of opposite
sign.
5 From this fact, it follows that the rate
of interest rSQ which clears the market for
currency and bank reserves also clears the
market for securities.
The bottom two panels of Figure 3 show
the determination of equilibrium quantities
of demand and time deposits. The demand
functions D
p and T
PD are drawn for the equi-





librium rate on securities, r8Q. At the deposit
rates rj and r* quoted by banks, the equi-
librium quantities of demand and time de-
posits are Do and To, respectively.
EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
The analysis of financial market responses
to exogenous disturbances begins by con-
sidering the effect of an open market opera-
tion on the money stock, time deposits, and
the security rate on the assumption that rates
paid by banks on deposits are fixed.
The treatment of an open market opera-
tion is shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.
Suppose the central bank engages in an open
market purchase, shifting Fo to Fi, and in-
creasing the quantity of currency and bank
reserves outstanding from Ro to Ri. Because
expenditures for goods and services are
assumed to be unaffected by financial market
variables in the short run, the aggregate de-
mand functions for securities and for cur-
rency and bank reserves are stable. The
equilibrium rate on securities must fall from
r8Q to r8l , shown by the intersections of Ri
Accordingly,
with R™ and of F5 with S
px
+B.
The model assumes that both time de-
posits and demand balances substitute for
securities. The drop in the security rate, con-
sequently, increases demand for both classes
of bank deposits, shifting both D
PD and T
PD to
the right and increasing equilibrium quanti-
ties of time and demand deposits. If cur-
rency substitutes for securities in the port-
folios of the public, as the slope of R
PD in
Figure 1 implies, public currency holdings
also are enlarged.
Growth in demand and time deposits
accompanying an open market purchase is
not viewed as the result of an increase in the
quantity of deposits that banks are willing to
supply, but of an enlarged public demand to
hold them that stems from falling security














rates. Increased bank willingness to supply
deposits would be reflected in higher rates
paid by banks to attract time and demand
balances; it is hard to imagine such a re-
sponse to easier bank reserve positions and
falling yields on bank earning assets.
It may be objected that the demand-pull
interpretation of deposit growth fails to
recognize the ultimate limits on the quantity
of demand and time deposits that the bank-
ing system is capable of supplying, given the
total quantity of currency and bank reserves
outstanding. These ultimate capacity limits,
represented by the dotted vertical segments
of the deposit supply functions of Figure 4,
are shifted to the right by an open market
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purchase that increases total claims against
the central bank.
These ultimate capacity limits on bank
deposits clearly exist, but their existence
does not contribute to an understanding of
why and how bank deposits change in re-
sponse to open market operations. The ulti-
mate limit on demand deposits, after all, is
encountered when the entire quantity of
currency and bank reserves outstanding is
absorbed by required reserves against de-
mand balances—and it implies that currency
held by the public, excess bank reserves, and
public holdings of time deposits are all zero.
Similarly, the capacity limit on time deposits
reflects zero holdings of currency and de-
mand balances by the public, and zero
excess bank reserves. Such extreme condi-
tions are not encountered in the real world.
SOME CONTRASTS WITH TRADITIONAL VIEWS
The view of the deposit expansion process
set forth here may be contrasted with some
time-honored doctrines of traditional mone-
tary analysis. The more conventional view
focuses on the impact of open market opera-
tions on the nominal money stock, taking
the stock of money as an exogenous variable
set by central bank policy. It has often been
implicitly assumed that time deposits are not
substitutes for securities sold to the mone-
tary system by the public. At one time, per-
haps, this assumption was suitable as a
working approximation. As noted earlier,
time deposits were once held primarily by
small savers, who may have been insensitive
to interest rate differentials on alternative
financial assets. In such a world, taking the
money stock as an exogenous variable might
seem justifiable. Yet, the assumption that
the money stock is determined by central
bank policies has led to substantial con-
fusion, and its usefulness is seriously ques-
tionable, no matter what role time deposits
play in monetary processes.
The element of volition in deposit expansion*
Gurley and Shaw, for example, have argued
that commercial banks are like other finan-
cial institutions in many respects and that
they must compete with such institutions by
making their liabilities attractive for the
public to hold.
6 This argument was received
in some quarters with astonishment and was
resisted by defenders of accepted doctrines.
Perhaps, Aschheim argued, banks are like
other financial institutions in their time de-
posit business but certainly not in their de-
mand deposit business.
7 When the banking
system wishes to create additional demand
deposits, said Culbertson, the public has no
choice but to acquire them, since the voli-
tional element in the process of deposit
expansion lies with the banks, not with the
public.
8
The confusion in this argument perhaps
comes from misinterpreting the exogeneity
assumption. For example, in the familiar
"hot potato" analogy used to explain mone-
tary processes, it is presupposed that the
central bank has the capability—through
open market purchases—of dictating an in-
crease in the money stock. The public then
has no choice but to hold the larger stock
of money, and individuals' efforts to part
with money balances merely redistribute the
stock from one hand to another, raising
6 See John G. Gurley and Edward S. Shaw, Money
in a Theory of Finance (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1960), pp. 198-99.
7 Joseph Aschheim, "Commercial Banks and Finan-
cial Intermediaries, Fallacies and Policy Implications,"
Journal of Political Economy, Feb. 1959, pp. 61-62.
8J. M. Culbertson, "Intermediaries and Monetary
Theory: A Criticism of the Gurley-Shaw Theory,"
American Economic Review, Mar. 1958, p. 122. A
similar view is put forth by J. A. Galbraith, The
Economics of Banking Operations (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1963), p. 9.
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nominal expenditures and income in the
process.
The initial premise is erroneous. Open
market purchases increase the aggregate of
currency and bank reserves outstanding; re-
establishment of equilibrium requires an
increase in the amount of currency and bank
reserves demanded to match the enlarged
supply. This increased demand does not
necessarily require expansion of the nominal
money stock. Increased demand for cur-
rency and bank reserves could, for example,
result solely from a rise in public demand
for time deposits and the induced increase
in bank demand for required reserves. In-
deed, public demands for currency, demand
deposits, and time deposits might all be
unaffected by an open market purchase; the
equilibrating adjustment could come entirely
from increased bank demand for excess re-
serves. In short, open market operations
alter the stock of money balances if, and
only if, they alter the quantity of money
demanded by the public.
Money supply hypotheses. It is possible to
express the quantity of money, and its re-
lation to other variables of the model, in a
way that effectively conceals this fact. Thus,
the equation:
M
where M is the quantity of currency and
demand balances, m is the reserve require-
ment against time deposits, and k is the
reserve requirement for demand deposits,
relates the money stock of the model to total
claims against the central bank, reserve
ratios against time and demand deposits,
public holdings of currency and time de-
posits, and bank ownership of excess re-
serves. Viewed in this way, changes in the
money stock are functions of changes in
the monetary base, Ro, and a series of "leak-
ages" into time deposits, currency, and
excess bank reserves.
Once the nature of these leakages has
been specified, the equation is properly
viewed as exhibiting a relation between the
equilibrium money stock and the reserve
base. Constructs of this nature are some-
times identified as "money supply hypoth-
eses."
 9 But they are devoid of postulates
regarding the willingness of any economic
unit to supply either of the two components
of the money stock—currency and demand
deposits. The construct is, in fact, simply an
equilibrium condition specifying that total
demand for currency and bank reserves
equals the total quantity outstanding.
While the equilibrium quantity of money
can be determined in this way, it must—in
a consistent model—be identical to that
found by summing the equilibrium quanti-
ties of currency and demand deposits ob-
tained from the public's demand functions
for these two financial assets. Determining
the impact of open market operations on the
money stock, consequently, requires knowl-
edge of the effect of these operations on the
endogenous variables of the system, no mat-
ter which procedure is used.
The role of interest rate adjustments. In tak-
ing the money stock as an exogenous vari-
able controlled by the central bank, tradi-
tional monetary analysis often regards a
decline in market rates of interest accom-
panying an open market purchase as the
result of the increase in actual money stocks
relative to desired stocks. In fact, changes in
the money stock and interest rates are deter-
mined simultaneously. But if logical priority
9 Karl Brainier and Allan H. Meltzer, "Some Further
Implications of Demand and Supply Functions for
Money," Journal of Finance, May 1964, especially pp.
242-56.
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is to be assigned to the correlative move-
ments of the two variables, changes in the
money stock are properly viewed as the
result, not the cause, of declining yields
on market securities.
Given the rates on deposits, the security
yield bears the entire burden of the adjust-
ment in the current period of the model,
since expenditures for goods are assumed to
respond to financial market variables with a
lag. An open market purchase requires the
yield on securities to fall until expanded
public demand for currency, together with
bank demand for reserves, absorbs the en-
larged stock of outstanding claims against
the central bank.
The role of the adjustment in the secu-
rity rate in the short run is displaced sub-
sequently by increases in nominal expend-
itures and income that result from the
initial changes in financial variables. But
when central bank actions influence spend-
ing decisions with a significant lag, the ini-
tial adjustment required to bring the de-
mand for currency and bank reserves into
balance with a changed supply is a decline
in the security rate. The extent of decline
depends on the interest elasticity of aggre-
gate demand for currency and bank re-
serves. This elasticity depends, in part, on
the interest sensitivity of bank demand for
excess reserves and public demands for cur-
rency and, in part, on the interest elasticity
of public demands for bank deposits.
It is interesting to note the implications
of a theory that specifies long lags between
monetary actions and their effects on spend-
ing, but also postulates that public demands
for money and time deposits are highly in-
terest inelastic. Friedman, for example,
contends that the lag between monetary ac-
tions and their effects on money income may
be as long as 16 months.
1
0 Yet he also ar-
gues that the interest elasticity of demand




These postulates are difficult to reconcile
with the way financial markets behave. In
the limiting case of complete interest inelas-
ticity of demand for money and time de-
posits, the effect of central bank operations
on the rate of interest would not alter pub-
lic demands for money and time deposits.
The money stock and time deposits would
change, therefore, only to the extent that
expenditures for goods and services re-
sponded to a varying rate of interest, there-
by changing the demand for these finan-
cial assets. Long lags between central bank
policy actions and their effects on spending
decisions would, in this case, imply the
absence of any short-run effect of open mar-
ket operations on the level of bank deposits
and public currency holdings. Changes in
the supply of currency and bank reserves,
in the short run, would be reflected entirely
in variations in bank demand for excess
reserves.
CYCLICAL VARIATIONS IN MONEY
AND TIME DEPOSITS
When the public regards time deposits and
securities as substitutes, open market opera-
tions of the central bank—by influencing
market rates on securities—influence the
level of time accounts, as well as money
balances, if time deposit rates adjust slowly
to changes in the rate on securities. The
effect of central bank operations is dispersed
over a wider range of financial assets than
1
0 See Milton Friedman, 'The Lag in Effect of
Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy,
Oct. 1961, pp. 457-64.
uSee Milton Friedman, "The Demand for Money:
Some Theoretical and Empirical Results," Journal of
Political Economy, Aug. 1959, especially p. 349.
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is contemplated in traditional analysis.
Such substitution is also likely to weaken
the association between money balances and
bank reserves by fostering procyclical move-
ments in the money stock.
Suppose, for example, that economic ex-
pansion is initiated by an increased rate of
investment, financed by an increased sup-
ply of securities. The effect on demands for
financial assets depends, in part, on the rise
in the rate on private securities, but it also
depends on the growth of income and
wealth—factors taken as exogenous to the
model. If income and wealth elasticities of
demand for demand deposits are high rela-
tive to those for time deposits, or if the in-
terest elasticity of demand for time deposits
is high relative to that for demand balances,
the quantity of demand deposits held by
the public may rise while the quantity of
time deposits held may fall. Thus, the money
stock may increase—even if the supply of
QUARTERLY CHANGES IN MONEY AND TIME DEPOSITS, 1952-64
NOTE.—Quarterly changes based on averages of daily figures,
seasonally adjusted. Methods used in calculating money stock
and time deposits are given in the July 1965 BULLETIN, pp.
933-35.
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currency and bank reserves is fixed, its divi-
sion between the banks and the public is
unchanged, and the quantity of excess bank
reserves is unaltered. The opposite sequence
might accompany a recession.
The postwar years prior to 1961 pro-
vided a setting in which switches between
time deposits and securities may have had an
impact of this kind on the money stock.
Time deposit rates were relatively unrespon-
sive to cyclical forces during this period,
although the trend was upward. Conse-
quently, cyclical fluctuations in market
rates of interest gave rise to a varying differ-
ential between rates on time deposits and
securities as well as between money bal-
ances and securities.
The chart shows quarterly changes in the
money stock and time deposits since 1951.
Broad cyclical swings in rates of addition
to the stock of money and time deposits
have been similar, suggesting that the de-
mand for time deposits, as well as money
balances, has been affected importantly by
market rates of interest. Cyclical turns in the
growth of money, however, have lagged
turning points in the growth of time depos-
its. Thus, in the recessions of 1953-54 and
1957-58, growth of time deposits began to
accelerate about one quarter before the
trough in growth of money balances; in the
expansion periods that followed, growth of
time deposits began to diminish before the
peak advance in money balances. But the
cyclical timing of the two series almost coin-
cided in the recession of 1960-61.
The money stock has a procyclical com-
ponent. As a matter of fact, money balances
were not enlarged appreciably during any of
the last three recessions—even though the
growth of total bank deposits and bank
credit accelerated. Periods of rapid mone-
tary growth were concentrated in the early
quarters of expansion, when gross national
product was rising sharply. Because it takes
the stock of money as a policy-determined
variable, traditional analysis assigns poor
marks to the central bank for its conduct of
policy in these circumstances. It fails to rec-
ognize that substitution between time depos-
its and securities may be an important
source of procyclical variations in the stock




To assess the role of substitution between
time deposits and securities as a factor in
money stock behavior, we turn to an econo-
metric study of the financial markets by
Frank de Leeuw.
1
3 The behavioral assump-
tions of the de Leeuw model are sufficiently
close to those employed here to make his
results usable, although there are some dif-
ferences. The de Leeuw model is of the
stock-adjustment form, and it postulates that
financial asset demands are homogeneous in
dollar magnitudes. Consequently all dollar-
1
2 Use of the money stock as an indicator of central
bank policy is questioned on broader grounds in an
unpublished paper by Patric Hendershott, "Monetary
Policy, 1952-62," given at the 1964 meetings of the
Econometric Society. Hendershott observes that pro-
cyclical movements in the money stock are also en-
gendered by the effects of the business cycle on mem-
ber bank borrowings and other technical factors af-
fecting bank reserves.
1
3 Frank de Leeuw, "A Model of Financial Behav-
ior," in the Brookings-SSRC Quarterly Econometric
Model of the U.S. Economy, edited by James S.
Duesenberry, Gary Fromm, Lawrence R. Klein, and
Edwin Kuh (Rand McNally and North Holland,
forthcoming). We are deeply indebted to de Leeuw
for permitting us to use the results of his work in
this paper; he is, of course, free of responsibility for
any misuse that we have made of it. Details on defini-
tions of the variables and the sources of data used in
the de Leeuw model are contained in a data appen-
dix to his paper. (Requests for this appendix should
be addressed to Mr. de Leeuw, Division of Research
and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, Washington, D.C., 20551.)
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value variables are measured as ratios to
wealth, where wealth is estimated by a meas-
ure of permanent income comparable to the
Friedman concept.
Equations describing changes in the pub-
lic's holdings of currency, demand deposits,
and time deposits, measured as a proportion
of the private sector's wealth, were esti-
mated by de Leeuw for quarterly periods
from 1948 through 1962. Ordinary least
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares
(TSLS) estimates of these equations, up-
dated to include 1963 and the first three
quarters of 1964, are shown in Table I.
1
4
(All tables appear on pages 1405 and 1406.)
The data there indicate that demands for
currency and demand deposits, particularly
the latter, are much more strongly influ-
enced by changes in current income than is
the demand for time deposits. Holdings of
demand deposits are positively related to
current household income, lagged house-
hold income, and current business income.
Time deposit ownership is significantly re-
lated only to the second of these three varia-
bles, and the coefficient of that income var-
iable is quite small.
In each of the demand functions shown
in the table, de Leeuw employed either an
average rate on private securities or the
Treasury bill rate, but not both. The regres-
sion coefficient of the private security rate
in the demand deposit equation is higher
than the Treasury bill rate coefficient in the
demand function for time deposits. As
shown in Table 2, however, the bill rate
moves through cyclical swings much larger




These results confirm the view that mone-
tary policy, through its impact on market
rates of interest, has an important bearing
on the level of commercial bank time depos-
its. They also indicate why the money stock
may vary procyclically around turning points
in economic activity despite countercyclical
changes in bank reserves.
CHANGES IN SUBSTITUTIONARY RELATIONS
The chart on page 1392 indicates that a
marked increase in the cyclical component
of time deposits developed in the mid-
1950's—judged, for example, by the extent
of the cyclical upswing during the recessions
of 1957-58 and 1960-61 compared with the
upswing during the recession of 1953-54.
One possible explanation for this develop-
ment is an increase in the degree of substitu-
tion between time deposits and securities.
Development of a national market for nego-
tiable CD's in 1961 may have been partly
responsible, but cyclical swings in time de-
posits suggest that a growing degree of sub-
stitution apparently developed prior to 1961.
Two results of increased substitution be-
tween time deposits and securities are im-
mediately evident. First, short-run changes
in the money stock, per dollar of open mar-
ket operations, are reduced, because more
of the change in the supply of currency and
bank reserves is absorbed in bank demand
"The de Leeuw model is a 19-equation representa-
tion of the financial markets; the three equations
extracted for inclusion in Table 1 are the most relevant
for our problem. The forms of the equations were not
altered in the re-estimation that includes data for 1963
and 1964.
1
5 The de Leeuw model visualizes the adjustment of
actual to desired asset stocks as taking place over more
than a single quarter and interprets the coefficient of
the lagged stock variable as a speed-of-adjustment
coefficient. Using this interpretation, it is possible to
compute equilibrium stock elasticities of demand for
each of the three financial assets. Evaluated at 1948-64
means, using the two-stage regression coefficients, the
equilibrium stock elasticity of demand for time de-
posits with respect to the bill rate is —1.7; the elasticity
of demand for demand deposits with respect to the
private security rate is —0.3.
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for required reserves to support time depos-
its. Substitution between time deposits and
securities lowers the "money multiplier."
Second, because reserve requirements for
time deposits are lower than those for de-
mand deposits, changes in total deposits and
in bank earning assets, per dollar of open
market operations, are increased. Substitu-
tion between time deposits and securities
raises the "bank credit multiplier."
These two results, however, do not carry
any necessary implications for the impact of
open market operations on market interest
rates, which provide the link between open
market operations and nominal expenditures












Federal Reserve Bulletin: October 19651396 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN • OCTOBER 1965
lars have become more or less "high pow-
ered" in a meaningful economic sense can-
not be deduced by reference to changes in
the money and bank credit multipliers. In
the context of the model, the significant
question concerns the effect of the in-
creased substitution on the response of ag-
gregate excess demand for securities, and of
aggregate demand for currency and bank
reserves, to changes in the security rate.
One possible source of greater substitu-
tion between time deposits and market secu-
rities is an increased response of public
security supply to changes in the private
security rate, shown by the twist of S
ps in
the lower left panel of Figure 5. As the
net supply of securities the public wishes to
sell to the monetary system becomes more re-
sponsive to rs, public demand for time de-
posits (and hence for the total of currency
and bank deposits) does also, as indicated
by the twist of R
p + D
PD + T
PD to the dotted
line in the upper left panel. Since a given
decline in r8 increases public demand for
time deposits more than before, it raises
bank demand for required reserves by a
larger amount. Total demand for currency
and bank reserves, R
P^
B, also becomes more
responsive to changes in r«, as shown in the
upper right panel. The offset in the market
for securities is an increase in the slope of
SJ
+*. Shifts in Ro and Fo which result from
a given dollar amount of open market oper-
ations then have a smaller effect on the
security rate and ultimately on spending de-
cisions. Consequently, a stabilizing mone-




On the other hand, increased substitution
between securities and time deposits may
1
6 This conclusion depends on the assumption that
time deposit rates are fixed.
reflect a displacement of currency and de-
mand deposits as substitutes for market se-
curities. This possibility is illustrated in Fig-
ure 6, where it is assumed that the increased
response of time deposit demand to changes
in r8 is offset entirely by a decreased response
of demand for demand balances to changes
in rs. As a consequence, the slope of public
demand for the total of currency and bank
deposits is not altered. A given decline in r8
enlarges public demand for demand depos-
its less, while raising demand for time de-
posits more. Therefore bank demand for re-
quired reserves is increased less, because
time deposits carry lower reserve require-
ments. Aggregate demand for currency and
bank reserves thus becomes less responsive
to changes in r«, as does S
PX*
B. Open market
operations shifting Ro and Fo by given
amounts now have a greater effect on the
market rate of interest and subsequently on
spending decisions.
The increased substitutability of time de-
posits for market securities since 1957
should not be expected to reflect either of
these two cases exclusively, but rather some
combination of them. Thus it is possible that
increased substitution prior to 1961 re-
flected primarily a displacement of demand
deposits as the "idle balances" of liquidity
preference analysis. But it is quite likely that
the growth of a national market for nego-
tiable CD's since 1961 has increased the
response of private security demands to
changes in market interest rates, especially
on short-term issues such as Treasury bills,
because the marketability feature of CD's
made time deposits a closer substitute for
market securities.
Evidence on this score can be obtained
by re-estimating the three de Leeuw equa-
tions of Table 1 for subperiods of the years
1948-64. The subperiods chosen for this










purpose were 1948-57 and 1958-64. This
breaks the full period at about the time
when an increased degree of substitution
between time deposits and market securities
apparently began to develop.
As Table 3 shows, the regression coeffi-
cients of the interest rate variables in the
equations for time deposits and demand
balances changed appreciably from the first
to the second subperiod. The coefficient of
the bill rate in the time deposit equation
increased (absolutely) nearly three-fold.
The coefficient of the private security rate
in the demand deposit equation declined
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absolutely, but the two-stage and ordinary
least squares estimates give substantially
different impressions of the decline. De-
mand for time deposits also seems to have
become more responsive to changes in time
deposit rates—very likely reflecting the
closer substitutability between time deposits
and short-term securities.
The de Leeuw model does not contain
equations relating to total public demands
for, or supplies of, marketable private secu-
rities comparable with the supply function
of our model. However, it does contain
equations explaining household and busi-
ness holdings of U.S. Government securi-
ties, and it is to be expected that changes
in the interest sensitivity of security demand
resulting from the increased substitution be-
tween time deposits and market instruments
would be evident in these equations. Table
4 shows these two de Leeuw equations re-




The results of the re-estimation for sub-
periods are mixed. As expected, demands
for U.S. Government securities prove to be
more responsive to changes in the Treasury
bill rate during the latter subperiod, with the
increased interest sensitivity confined princi-
pally to the business sector. But the data
shown in Table 3, together with general
reasoning about the effects of increased sub-
stitutability between securities and time de-
posits, lead to the expectation that security
demands should also have become more re-
sponsive to changes in time deposit rates.
The regression coefficients of the time de-
posit rate in the security demand functions
of Table 4 are generally lower in 1958-64
than in the 1952-57 subperiod, however.
The empirical evidence is not conclusive
regarding the meaning of increased substi-
tution between time deposits and securities
for the impact of open market operations on
market rates of interest. The evidence sug-
gests that the interest sensitivity of public
demand for both securities and demand bal-
ances has been altered significantly, but it
does not yield fully satisfactory estimates of
these changes. Whether reserve dollars have
become more high powered as a conse-
quence of this increased substitution must
remain an open question.
VARIATIONS IN DEPOSIT RATES
The implications of changes in time deposit
rates have not yet been considered. The sig-
nificance of such changes has been treated
sparingly in monetary analysis, probably
because there was no clear evidence, until
quite recently, that rates paid by banks on
time deposits changed much in the short
run.
1
8 Sharp adjustments in time deposit
rates have followed each of the four in-
creases in ceiling rates under Regulation Q
since 1956, however, and rates quoted by
banks on CD's appear to be highly sensitive
to changes in market yields on Treasury
bills.
Movements in time deposit rates immedi-
ately following Regulation Q changes and
adjustments in CD rates in response to vari-
ations in bill yields illustrate two different
categories of deposit rate variation. Those
following a change in Regulation Q reflect
an exogenous disturbance introduced by pol-
icy actions. But the adjustment of CD rates
by banks in response to variations in the
yields on bank earning assets is a response
"The initial year of 1952, in this instance, was dic-
tated by the availability of quarterly flow of funds
data.
1
8 Though treated sparingly, the significance of vary-
ing deposit rates has not been overlooked completely.
See, for example, John G. Gurley and Edward S.
Shaw, op. cit., Chapter 5.









to market forces. These deposit rate changes
are properly characterized as endogenous.
The implications of these two categories of
deposit rate changes are very different.
Exogenous changes in deposit rates. Exoge-
nous changes in time deposit rates disturb
an existing equilibrium in the financial mar-
kets, raising or lowering the rate on private
securities and thereby influencing expendi-
tures for goods and services in subsequent
periods. Unless the resulting impact in com-
modity markets is in keeping with policy
objectives, offsetting open market opera-
tions are required to keep interest rates on
securities stable.
The effect of an exogenous rise in time










deposit rates on the private security rate of
the model depends on the shifts it induces
in the public's desired holdings of financial
assets.
1
9 Suppose, at one extreme, that the
1
9 In the discussion that follows, the possibility that
currency and time deposits may be substitutes is
ignored. The extremely small, and statistically insignif-
icant, coefficient of the time deposit rate in the cur-
rency equation for the 1958-64 subperiod, shown in
Table 3, seems to justify this.
increase in public demand for time deposits
that accompanies a rise in time deposit rates
is matched by an equal increase in the pub-
lic's net supply of securities. This case is
illustrated in Figure 7, where the increase
in net public security supply shown in the
lower left panel is counterbalanced by an
equal rise in demand for time accounts—
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and hence in the demand for the total of
currency and bank deposits—shown in the
panel at the upper left. Since public demand
for bank deposits is larger at each rate of
interest on securities, so also is bank demand
for required reserves. Total demand for cur-
rency and bank reserves is larger at each
rate of interest on securities; correspond-
ingly, aggregate excess demand for securi-
ties is lower. Given the total quantity of
currency and bank reserves, the private se-
curity rate must rise from rSQ to r8l to re-
establish equilibrium in the current period.
Alternatively, suppose the increased pub-
lic demand for time deposits accompanying
a rate increase on time accounts reflected
an equivalent reduction in public demand
for demand deposits. Public demand for the
total of currency and bank deposits—at
each rate of interest on securities—would
then be unaffected, as shown in the upper
left panel of Figure 8. But at each rate of
interest on securities, the mix of public de-
mand for bank deposits would be shifted
from demand deposits toward time accounts,
on which reserve requirements are lower.
Bank demand for required reserves would,
accordingly, be smaller at each rate rs, and
aggregate excess demand for securities




B in the two panels on the right. The
rate of interest on securities thus would be
driven down, from rSo to r«2.
Although the impact of an exogenous
change in time deposit rates on market rates
of interest, given the level of bank reserves
and currency, is ambiguous, there is one
principle that remains invariant. If time de-
posits and securities are substitutes, and
the empirical evidence clearly indicates they
are, an exogenous rise in time deposit rates
always increases market rates of interest un-
less bank earning assets increase. Banks
must absorb the securities the public wishes
to part with, at existing rates on securities,
if security rates are not to rise.
The effect of an exogenous rise in time
deposit rates works initially on existing
stocks of financial assets, shifting demand
from demand deposits and securities to time
accounts. To prevent this shift in demand
among existing stocks of assets from raising
interest rates on market securities, total bank
earning assets (and hence total bank depos-
its) must undergo a once-for-all increase.
Higher rates on time deposits also affect
flow demands for financial assets, however.
As income and wealth increase, public de-
mands for currency, demand deposits, time
deposits, and securities are all likely to rise,
but the higher the rate on time accounts, the
larger is the proportion of this flow demand
for financial assets that is channeled into
time deposits. Interpreted in the context of
an economy with growth in income and
wealth, higher time deposit rates restrict
spending unless they are accompanied by a
higher rate of growth of bank credit and
deposits. Formulas for central banking
which assume that desired additions to
money and time deposits are determined by
trends in income and wealth do not cope
with the meaning of changing rates of return
on bank deposits relative to other financial
assets.
Endogenous changes in deposit rates. En-
dogenous changes in time deposit rates oc-
cur when banks adjust the rates they pay
in response to variations in market rates of
interest. Endogenous variations in deposit
rates make open market operations either
more or less "high powered," because they
alter the equilibrium change in market rates
stemming from open market purchases and
sales.
Whether these open market operations are
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made more, or less, high powered depends—
in the context of the model—on the degree
of substitution between time deposits and
other financial assets. If time deposits sub-
stitute principally for demand balances, a
change in time deposit rates generates an
opposite movement in the private security
rate, as noted earlier. In this case, open
market operations are made less powerful.
Purchases by the central bank that drive
down the security rate induce banks to lower
offering rates on time deposits. Falling rates
on time deposits, however, reduce aggregate
excess demand for securities and moderate
the decline in the security rate.
Contrariwise, when time deposits substi-
tute principally for securities, open market
operations become more high powered. For
when open market purchases drive down
the market rate on securities, an induced
reduction of time deposit rates increases
aggregate excess demand for securities, and
this accelerates the decline in the security
rate.
Empirical evidence. The degree to which
time deposits substitute for other financial
assets is clearly an important empirical ques-
tion. Results obtained from the de Leeuw
model—reported earlier—shed some light
on the question, but they do not provide
fully satisfactory answers.
The de Leeuw model is of the stock-ad-
justment form—it postulates that adjust-
ments to changes in desired asset stocks do
not occur within a single quarter but are
spread over longer periods. The full equi-
librium-stock adjustments in financial asset
holdings, following a change in yield rela-
tionships, differ materially from the re-
sponses in the initial quarter.
Table 5 shows both the initial quarter
and the equilibrium-stock response of pub-
lic demands for currency, demand deposits,
time deposits, and household and business
security holdings to changes in time deposit
rates—based on the two-stage least squares
estimates for 1948-64.
2
0 Changes in desired
financial asset holdings are expressed in
billions of dollars per 1 percentage point
change in the rate on time deposits.
The evidence is not easy to interpret. For
initial-quarter responses, the figures shown
imply that public demands for money and
U.S. Government securities decline more,
in response to an increase in time deposit
rates, than the demand for time accounts
increases—an implausible result. The equi-
librium-stock responses do not suffer from
this ambiguity, but they suggest shifts among
stocks of financial assets, in response to




It seems appropriate to interpret these
results with considerable caution. The equi-
librium-stock responses suggest that only a
small portion of the increased demand for
time deposits accompanying a time deposit
rate increase represents demand diverted
from currency and demand deposits. The
largest portion represents funds diverted
from household and business holdings of
U.S. Government securities, and from other
financial assets not encompassed by the five
equations—including private securities and
claims against nonbank intermediaries. It
2
0 For securities, the period is 1952-64.
2
1 The magnitude of the equilibrium-stock responses
depends importantly on the size of the coefficient of
the lagged-stock variable. As de Leeuw noted in his
study, coefficients of lagged-stock variables are espe-
cially sensitive to specification error; it thus seems wise
to interpret the results that depend on them cautiously.
Additionally, the quarterly interest rate for time de-
posits used in the de Leeuw model is generated from
annual data, because quarterly figures are not avail-
able. Because it is not possible to evaluate the ac-
curacy of the resulting quarterly data, estimates of
demand elasticities with respect to the time deposit
rate may be biased to an unknown degree.
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thus appears that when time is allotted for
full equilibrium-stock adjustments to occur,
a time deposit rate increase exerts upward
pressure on market rates of interest unless
compensating open market operations ex-
pand the supply of currency and bank re-
serves. The short-run impact of an increase
in time deposit rates, on the other hand,
apparently reduces demand for demand de-
posits significantly. It is thus possible that
the short-run effect lowers average reserve
requirements enough to generate a tempo-
rary fall in market rates of interest, given
the supply of currency and bank reserves.
SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The principal focus throughout this paper
has been on the policy implications of view-
ing banks as sellers of claims against them-
selves for the public to hold, rather than as
"creators of money." It may be helpful to
summarize the main thread of the argument.
A traditional way of viewing monetary
processes that has recently gained in popu-
larity takes as its initial premise that central
bank actions affect spending decisions by
altering the actual stock of money balances
relative to the desired stock. The public, it
is argued, has only negligible power to alter
the actual stock of money; that power lies
in the hands of the central bank. Conse-
quently, when policy actions raise actual
money stocks relative to desired stocks, the
public's efforts to exchange money for other




One could not object seriously to this
view of monetary processes if increases in
the money stock took the form of gifts of
money distributed to the public by the cen-
2
3 Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, "Predicting
Velocity: Implications for Theory and Policy," Journal
of Finance, May 1963, p. 322.
tral bank. But in a world in which expansive
policy measures take such forms as open
market purchases and lowered reserve re-
quirements, central bank actions do not
affect the actual money stock except as they
lead to a change in desired money balances.
The effect of these actions on money in-
come occurs not because the money stock
has been altered, but because financial vari-
ables through which the central bank alters
the desired stock of money also affect the
public's decisions to purchase goods and
services.
There are conditions under which changes
in the money stock can be rationalized as an
appropriate indicator of monetary policy
conducted through conventional means.
What is required is that movements in the
money stock reflect the influence of central
bank actions on the prices and yields of
financial assets and on the nonprice terms
governing the availability of credit to pri-
vate borrowers. Changes in the money stock
may then serve as a proxy for the more com-
plex set of financial variables that enter
expenditure functions. Whether financial
markets ever behaved in such a way as to
permit this interpretation of changes in the
money stock is debatable, but there is little
doubt that such a simple rule for appraisal
of central bank operations is no longer ap-
propriate.
The existence of time deposits and other
classes of bank liabilities that substitute for
securities loosens the link between central
bank actions and money, making the money
stock an untrustworthy indicator of the
effects of policy actions on financial asset
prices and yields. The attractive simplicity
of the money-stock guide to central bank
policy cannot be salvaged by redefining the
money stock to include other classes of bank
liabilities, however. Variable rates of return
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on bank deposits make simple rules of
growth in money, regardless of how money
is defined, unsuitable guidelines for the con-
duct of monetary policy.
There remains no alternative but to search
for indicators among the relevant financial
variables that enter expenditure functions—
prices, yields, and nonprice terms on finan-
cial assets. It is not pleasant to face the com-
plexities of this task. Unfortunately, there is
no single financial variable in which the
essence of monetary ease and restraint is
distilled, and the influence of financial varia-
bles on expenditures is not so conveniently
timed as to make possible an easy separa-
tion of the financial market effects of policy
actions from those produced by shifts in the
private sector's demand and supply func-
tions for securities. Financial market behav-
ior is too complex for simple monetary rules
to work.
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TABLE 1


















































































































































TSLS = two-stage least squares; OLS = ordinary least squares;
s.e. = standard error of estimate; D.W.= Durbin-Watson ratio.
1 One-quarter lag.
2 The market yield on 3-month Treasury bills.
3 A weighted average of rates on corporate and municipal bonds,
mortgages, and bank loans to business.
NOTE.—Based on the de Leeuw model cited in footnote 13,
p. 1393. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the regression
coefficients.
All variables other than interest rates are measured as a percentage
of permanent dollar gross national product in the previous quarter.
The coefficients may therefore be interpreted as though all dollar
variables were measured in the same units. For the dollar-valued






CYCLICAL TROUGHS AND PEAKS IN INTEREST RATES,
1948-64




































































1 A weighted average of rates on corporate and municipal bonds,
mortgages, and bank loans to business used by de Leeuw (see foot-
note 13, p. 1393, for citation).
2 The market yield on 3-month Treasury bills.
TABLE 5
CHANGE IN DESIRED FINANCIAL ASSET HOLDINGS PER
PERCENTAGE POINT INCREASE IN TIME DEPOSIT
RATE, 1948-64























NOTE.—Based on Table 1 and equations for household and business
holdings of securities comparable to those in Table 4 but covering the
period 1952-64. Equilibrium stock figures are derived by dividing
initial quarter responses shown above by the coefficients of the rele-
vant lagged stock variables.
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TABLE 3




























































































































































































































































For explanation of abbreviations and description of data see footnotes to Table 1, p. 1405.
TABLE 4





















































































































































For explanation of abbreviations and description of data see footnotes to Table 1, p. 1405.
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